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This is a remarkable book with many agreeable features. It is of limited
physical dimensions (no book ought to be more than two or three hundred
pages in length!). It is written in plain language and in a clear style. You are
always able immediately to grasp the intention of the author. The organization
and structure of the work is simple and well-arranged. It is not (as are so
many works on jurisprudence) a book on books. The author is more inter-
ested in his subject than in the literature on the subject. Discussions are cut
down to a minimum and tucked away in notes. He illuminates old problems
in the light of the modern Oxford philosophy. In this light, answers you have
known before take on a new dimension of meaning. It is easy to read the book
and it is a pleasure. You should read it !
The organization of the book, as I have said, is simple. Having stated in an
introductory chapter that speculation about the nature of law has centered al-
most continuously upon three principal issues, the author accordingly divides
his exposition into three main parts. The first issue is: how far is it possible
to understand law by means of the gunman's model, i.e., as orders backed by
threats?' The second principal issue-and the second part of the book-is
concerned with what are rules, and to what extent is law an affair of rules.2
The third perennial question is how far law in its "essence" is a branch of
morality or justice, how far legal obligations are related to or different from
moral duties.3 A concluding chapter is concerned with specific problems of
international law.
I
To anyone well acquainted with the writings of and about John Austin,
the chapters dealing with the "gunman's model" will hardly seem earth-shak-
ing; but the way in which the shortcomings of the model are demonstrated is
new, refreshing, and convincing. It is an essential point in Hart's criticism
of the Austinian model that it does not take notice of the distinction between
two kinds of rules which Hart calls primary and secondary rules. (I myself
have used the terms, rules of conduct and rules of competence, for the same
distinction. 4) The primary rules are duty-imposing; they are immediately con-
cerned with the behavior required of human beings. The secondary rules are
1. This issue is dealt with in chapters II, III, and IV.
2. Chapters V, VI, and VII.
3. Chapters VIII and IX.
4. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 32, 51,59,79 (1958).
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power-conferring; they provide that human beings under certain conditions
shall have the power (competence) to create by their acts (acts in law) new
rules belonging to the system. It is Hart's main thesis that law is a union of
primary and secondary rules and that the understanding of this combination is
the key to the science of jurisprudence. 5 This thesis should not be understood as
a definition in the sense of a rule by which the correctness of the use of the
word "law" can be tested. It should rather be understood as an attempt to
point out the "essence" of law which-when this 'word is deprived of its
original metaphysical implication-means some qualities with great explana-
tory power.6
This leading point of view is elaborated in chapters V, VI, and VII which
form the central exposition of the author's own views. The power-conferring
rules are divided in three subgroups: rules of recognition, rules of change, and
rules of adjudication. The rules of recognition specify some feature or features
possession of which is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that the rule
belongs to the system, that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the
organized pressure of the judicial and executive organs. These rules will in-
dicate, e.g., the conditions under which a rule may be created by enaction
(legislation) or by the force of customs or precedents. The reader will under-
stand that Hart under the label of "rules of recognition" is concerned with
what usually is called the sources of law. It is assumed that when a plurality of
sources are recognized, they will be ranked in an order of relative sub-
ordination and primacy. Thus, in the British system, customs and precedents
are subordinate to legislation. Because of this hierarchical structure, it is pos-
sible to consider the various rules of recognition as integrated logically in one
and only one rule: the rule of recognition.7 In this way the logical unity of the
system is guaranteed.8
The rules of recognition give rise to the notion of validity. To say that a
rule is valid means that it satisfies the criteria of recognition and therefore
will be accepted and applied according to its content. If a rule does not satisfy
the criteria it is invalid or without legal effects. 9 The rule of recognition is the
supreme norm of the system from which the validity of any other norm is
derived. It is apparent that this ultimate rule is similar to the "basic norm" in
Kelsen's pure theory of law. There is, however, a difference of great conse-
5. P. 79.
6. Pp. 17, 151, 208.
7. Pp. 44, 93, 98, 102, 144.
8. The much cherished logical unity of a legal order, in my opinion, is more a
fiction or a postulate than a reality. The various sources in actual fact do not make out a
logical hierarchy but a set of co-operating factors. Custom and precedents, says Hart, in
the British system are subordinate to legislation. I believe that Hart, if he tried to verify
this assertion, would find that it squares better with a confessed, official ideology than
with facts. International law, according to Hart, is no system but a set of rules. Pp.
230-31. Why is it tacitly assumed that municipal law is a systematic unity?
9. P. 100. See also pp. 68-69.
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quence. To Hart, a statement of validity is always relative to another rule of
the system, ultimately to the supreme norm of recognition. When validity in
this way is relative to a rule of recognition, the notion cannot be applied to
the supreme rule of recognition itself. Once we arrive at the top, we can no
longer ask for validity. The question is now a question of existence.10 Does
the supreme rule-and through it I should add the whole system-actually
exist, i.e., is the system a social reality or only an imaginary structure? This
question, according to Hart, is an empirical question of fact. When we make
the assertion that a legal system exists we in fact refer in compressed, port-
manteau form to a number of heterogeneous social facts, especially to the way
in which courts in actual practice identify what is to count as law, and to
the general acceptance of or acquiescence in these identifications."
This view is in complete harmony with my own views on verification of
propositions about the existence of legal rules,' 2 but it is contrary to the
teachings of Kelsen. Kelsen also holds that the supreme rule of recognition
(the basic norm) possesses validity, but in his view its validity must be
postulated or hypothetically assumed. Hart rightly criticizes this view but does
not seem to understand that Kelsen's divergent opinion is not a matter of the
basic norm being inconsequential, but the manifestation of quite another con-
ception of "validity." That a norm is valid means, according to Kelsen, that
individuals ought to behave as stipulated in the norm. Hart calls this "a need-
less reduplication" and says that it is "mystifying" to speak of a rule making
it an obligation to perform the obligations established in another rule. The
mystery is dispelled, however, once it is understood that the notion of validity
with which Kelsen operates is the traditional idea of a "higher" claim on
obedience, the natural law idea transformed into a quasi-positivist mould: the
higher validity is not derived from any absolute principle but postulated as
inherent in any actually efficacious legal order.'8
In the third section of the book Hart deals with the relation of law to
morals. He gives an analysis of the idea of justice which squares well with
that given by me in my book On Law and Justice. The essence of justice, he
says, is equality, the claim that like cases shall be treated alike. This principle
presupposes a material standard of evaluation to decide what makes cases alike.
In itself the idea of justice is incomplete, an empty form which cannot afford
any determinate guide to conduct.' 4 I completely agree--but don't see why
Hart then stamps my view, that the words "just" and "unjust" are devoid
of meaning when applied to a legal rule, as an absurdity. Is it absurd to say of
10. Compare Ross, ON LAw AND JusTicE 70 (1958).
11. Pp. 105, 109, 245.
12. See Ross, op. cit. supra note 4, at 34-38. On the misunderstandings caused by
my use of the word "validity" where Hart speaks of "existence," see page 35.
13. I have elaborated this view in a review of Hans Kelsen, What is Justice?, 45
C~ur. L. Rrv. 564 (1957) and in an article Validity and the Conflict Between Legal
Positivism and Natural Law to be published in REMSTA JUrIDICA DE BuENos AIRES.
14. P. 155.
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an empty form that it is devoid of meaning? I have worked out the distinction
between the formal principle of equality and the supplementary material stan-
dard with great care, and it should be evident that my phrase points to exactly
the same conclusion as that stated by Hart-that the idea of justice without
such supplementation cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct.
In the chapter on Law and Morals Hart reckons with the Natural Law
claim that law necessarily must conform to some extent with morals. Without
denying that law and morals are interrelated in many ways, Hart denies the
idea of a necessary conformity. In last analysis, it is a question of expediency
in forming our concepts. It seems clear, he says, that nothing is to be gained,
either theoretically or practically, by denying the name of law to a bad or
even an abominable system if that system in other respects presents the features
of a legal order.15
II
A recurrent theme of high interest is the distinction made by Hart between
internal and external statements in our language referring to legal rules. This
distinction is related to, but not identical with, a distinction between the in-
ternal and external aspect of a legal rule (or any social rule). The distinction
between the two aspects of a rule is no new idea. It has often been pointed out
that a social rule is more than a mere regularity in observable behavior and
that legal rules for this reason cannot be ascertained and described merely by
behavioristic methods. I myself have stressed this point in saying that a social
rule presupposes not only an observable regularity but also that the rule be
felt as "socially binding" by the human beings following it. This means that
a person not only will feel himself spontaneously motivated ("bound") to a
certain pattern of behavior, but at the same time will expect that a breach of
the rule will call forth a protest from his fellows in the group.' 6
Hart objects that it is a misrepresentation to depict the internal aspect as a
matter of feelings. Such feelings of being bound may occur but are neither
necessary nor sufficient for the existence of "binding" rules. "What is neces-
sary," says Hart, "is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to cer-
tain patterns of behavior as a common standard, and that this should display
itself in criticisim (including self criticism), demands for conformity, and in
acknowledgements that such criticism and demands are justified, all of which
find their characteristic expression in the normative terminology of 'ought,'
'must,' and 'should,' 'right' and 'wrong.' "11 For my own part, however, I
am unable to understand how it is possible that a person could have an attitude
as described-criticize himself for breaking the rule, and acknowledge that
criticism on the part of his fellows is justified-and still feel free to act as he
likes. I believe that the attitude and reactions described by Hart are the overt
manifestations of feelings engendered in the individual during his growth in
15. P. 205.
16. Ross, op. cit. supra note 4, at 14.
17. P. 56.
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the group. Hart uses the word "acceptance" or even "voluntary acceptance"
to depict the internalization of the rule. In my view this is misleading, point-
ing too much in the direction of a deliberate decision. It may, in extraordinary
situations-e.g., under revolutions-happen that an attitude of allegiance is the
outcome of a decision. But most people will feel themeseleves bound by the
social norms of the group without ever being conscious of any choice or de-
cision.
When a social group, says Hart, has certain rules of conduct, this fact
affords an opportunity for many closely related, yet different, kinds of asser-
tion; for it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as an
observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which
accepts and uses them as guides to conduct. The two kinds of statements are
called, respectively, external and internal statements. 18 I believe this distinc-
tion to be very important as it seems to throw new light on controversies in the
analysis of legal concepts. For my part I want to add that the internal language
is not of a descriptive nature. Its function is not to state or describe facts, not
to confer information of any kind, but to present claims, to admonish, to
exhort. When I say "You borrowed my car. It is your duty to take good care
of it," my intention is to claim a certain behaviour from the borrower and to
justify this claim by a reference to the (legal or moral) rules concerning
borrowing. I don't inform him of the rules, I apply them. The external lan-
guage, on the other hand, is descriptive in nature. It is concerned with facts, the
description and prediction of facts.
Hart primarily is concerned with the internal language and it is his belief
that most of the obscurities and distortions surrounding legal and political
concepts will vanish if it is understood that they essentially involve reference
to the internal point of view.'91 He displays little concern with the external
language. When he occasionally refers to it he seems to consider members of
dissenting minorities within a group as the users of this language. Rejecting
the rules, the dissenters talk about them only from the point of view of
what probably will happen if the rules are broken.2 0 To me it is astonishing
that Hart does not see, or at any rate does not mention, the most obvious use
of the external language in the mouth of an observer who as such neither
accepts nor rejects the rules but solely makes a report about them: the legal
writer in so far as his job is to give a true statement of the law actually in
force. 21
18. Pp. 55, 86, 99.
19. P. 96.
20. P. 88.
21. Hart seems to assume that the language used by officials, lawyers, or private
persons speaking about legal matters is normally the internal language. This is a rather
rough simplification. When a client consults his counsel, the information received will be
external statements describing the law actually in force and calculating the chances for
a successful lawsuit. Moreover, a lawyer pleading before a court, especially an appellate
court, may, at any rate partially, refer to the law as an observable fact. And the same is
the case with judges and other officials in the opinion rendering a decision.
1962] 1189
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III
Hart's attitude---concerned, as it is, exclusively with the practical-normative
use of legal terms in daily language-may be explained partly by the cor-
responding well-known attitude of the Oxford philosophy in its approach to
analytic problems generally, partly by the fact that Hart is himself neither a
legal writer nor educated as a professional lawyer. My attitude, on the other
hand, as clearly stated in On Law and Justice, has been to direct my analysis
toward legal concepts as they function in the doctrinal study of law, what we
on the Continent are accustomed to call the science of law. If this difference
in approach is understood and remembered a good deal of the criticism
directed by Hart against Scandinavian Realism, 2 and particularly against me,
must be dropped as misdirected.
The same conclusion seems warranted with regard to his discussion of
"validity." As mentioned above, Hart analyzes this concept as used internally
or relative to a given rule of recognition. A statement of validity, in his view,
is a statement according to the system or applying a rule of the system. No
wonder that Hart cannot accept my analysis of "validity" in terms of social
facts. If he had been a little more attentive, he would have noticed that the
issue which I treat is quite different from that with which he deals. As clearly
appears from the way in which the problem is stated and treated, I am con-
cerned with the external statement concerning the existence of a rule or system
of rules. I admit that Hart may be excused for the misunderstanding because
the use of the word "validity" to designate the existence of a rule-as I now
understand-is odd in English usage. This shows how difficult the job of
translation is. In Danish as in German two varieties of the same root occur:
gylding and gaeldende. Whereas gyldig functions in the same way as valid the
phrase gaeldende ret is used externally to designate the existing law, the law in
force.
When this is taken into account there exists, as far as I can see, virtually no
disagreement between Hart and myself. Hart concurs in the opinion that the
question of the existence of a rule or a system of rules is an empirical question
of fact depending on the way in which the courts in actual practice identify what
is to count as law. It is a good policy to discuss matters only with people with
whom you agree-in fundamentals. Following this policy I have discussed
some aspects of Hart's work in the belief that, in fundamentals, the Oxford
Philosophy and the Scandinavian Approach have more in common than Hart
has been able to see. That the appreciation is not mutual is no reason why I
should not express my high esteem for his work and my belief that we are
following the same path.
ALF Rosst
22. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, 14 CASBRIDGE L.J. 233 (1959).
tProfessor of Jurisprudence and Philosophy, University of Copenhagen.
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